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1. Introduction
Fault tolerance is a critical point for long-running parallel-distributed applications executing in
Massive Cluster of Workstations (MCOW). From the user’s point of view, a parallel application
should run and finish correctly, but users rarely want to worry about including fault tolerance capa-
bilities in their algorithms because of the software engineering costs. The cluster’s administrators,
in turn, request that the fault tolerance scheme consume as few resources as possible. Because in-
creasing the number of nodes causes the MTBF to reduce, long-running applications demands a fault
tolerance scheme that be independent of the cluster scalability.
The fault tolerance scheme could rely on a fault-tolerant hardware; however, such solution is
expensive in practice. An alternative would be to develop fault-tolerant algorithms. However, such
solution demands a big software engineering effort, and it cannot be applied to algorithms already
coded. A third possibility is to build a software layer between the application and the system in order
to isolate the faults from the application. This is an interesting alternative since it does not require
any special hardware, and makes the fault tolerance scheme fully transparent to the user.
Rollback-recovery is the classical method used when it is necessary to offer fault tolerance for a
long-running parallel-distributed application based on message passing in a cluster [7]. Rollback-
recovery techniques can be implemented by a software layer, and are divided into two broad cate-
gories: the ones based only in checkpoints and the ones based in checkpoint and in message logs.
The first ones make checkpoints of individual processes associated with a certain checkpoint syn-
chronization scheme to assure that the system rolls back and recover from a consistent global state
after a failure. The latter ones also aggregate message’s logs for each individual process in order to
allow the system to recover from a point later than the latter consistent global state [5].
The main difference between these techniques is expressed by two parameters: a) the runtime
overhead over fault-free execution and b) the fault penalty. The overhead directly relates to the
efficiency of the rollback-recovery scheme without faults, and it is strongly related to the cluster
resources consumed by the rollback-recovery protocol [4]. For example, from the user’s point of
view, a fault tolerance scheme using message log interferes on the latency of message’s transmission.
Furthermore, both checkpoints and logs require a additional storage resources and such resources
impact over the cluster architecture.
The fault penalty depends on the efficiency of the rollback-recovery scheme after a failure. It
derives from two main parameters: a) the cost of recovering itself and b) the cluster architecture
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2after the failure. The cost depends on how far a set of processes must rollback in order to reach a
consistent global state, i.e., how much computation is lost. Factors like process’s interaction and
checkpoint interval strong influence the cost of recovering. For example, short checkpoint intervals
permit that a process loses little computation because it needs to recover from a relatively recent
point. However, short checkpoint intervals strongly influence the system performance because of
the frequent interruptions in the process’s execution. The cluster architecture after a failure, in turn,
determines how many nodes are available to continue the computation.
Several studies have focused on the behavior of the rollback-recovery protocols and some imple-
mentations have been built for practical systems (see section 2.5). Such studies and implementations
have concentrated on the particularities of the protocols or on the performance aspects, but they gave
little attention to the relationship between the fault tolerance scheme and the cluster architecture.
Such relationship is important because it allows an evaluation of the impact of the fault tolerance
scheme over the cluster architecture. Furthermore, using such relationship it is possible to build
models for the cluster architecture in the presence of failures. These models are very useful when
the user needs to know how many failures his/her system can bear, or how failures interfere on
his/her application.
Taking into consideration that any fault tolerance scheme for MCOWs must be scalable and that
the relationship between the cluster architecture and the fault tolerance scheme is relevant in order
to allow the user to evaluate its application in the presence of failures, we have developed a fault
tolerant architecture that attends to both requisites.
Our architecture RADIC bases on two distributed arrays of dedicated processes that together im-
plement a distributed fault tolerance controller. One array is composed by protector processes, which
are in charge of the cluster’s nodes, and the other array is composed by observer processes, which
care of the processes of the parallel-distributed application. Both arrays of processes work transpar-
ently and independently in order to isolate faults from the application. Such architecture establishes
a deterministic behavior for the cluster architecture after a node failure and it is easily adaptable to
the cluster configuration.
The next section contains a description of the architecture, and a comparison with some related
works. Section 3 presents the validation of the architecture using a practical implementation. In
section 4, we state our conclusions and relate the future works.
2. RADIC: A scalable architecture for fault tolerance in clusters
RADIC - Redundant Array of Distributed Independent Checkpoints is a functional architecture
model based on two arrays of system processes: protectors and observers. Together, these processes
compose a distributed fault tolerance controller.
Protectors are processes that monitor each cluster node, and function like a distributed stable
storage system. Observers are processes that control the checkpoints and message logs of each
application process (one observer for each application process).
Figure 1a depicts the interaction between processes in a cluster with four nodes (N1..N4). Each
node has a protector process (T1..T4). There are five observer process (Oa..Oe), each one attached
to an application processes (A..E). Doted lines indicate the relations between protectors processes,
and continuous lines indicate the relations between observers and protectors.
The overhead caused by RADIC over a failure-free operation is the same caused by any fault-
tolerance scheme since it does not add new overheads for the recovery mechanism. The overhead on
application runtime will mainly depend on three factors: a) runtime enlargement of the application













N1 N2 N3 N4


















Figure 1. An application composed by 5 process (A..E) running in a cluster with 4 nodes (N1..N4)
including the RADIC components. a) Operation without failures; b) A fault in N4 forces T3 to find
T1, Oc connects to protector T1, and T1 recovers processes D and E.
the recover protocol algorithm. The cluster suffers a performance reduction because of: a) the in-
creasing of disk I/O (checkpoints and logs storage) in each machine and b) the increasing of network
traffic (checkpoint and log transmission from the observers to protectors).
Fault penalty depends on: a) the number of processes that will rollback; b) how much computation
is lost in each application process rollback; and c) the final architecture of the cluster after a failure.
The last factor increases application runtime if the final cluster architecture has fewer nodes, which
causes a lower performance. Nevertheless, in a large scale cluster, loss of just a few nodes in the
cluster will probably have little influence on overall performance.
In the next sections we explain the basic functionality of RADIC, a more detailed explanation
about the RADIC architecture functionality and modules can be found in [6].
2.1. System Model
A distributed application consists of a set of concurrent executing processes that cooperate with
each other to perform a task. The processes communicate only through message passing. There
are P processes in a cluster with N nodes. In failure-free executions, all the N nodes are available.
The system will support a Maximum Number of Failure Nodes (MNFN). If a node fails, it will be
definitely discarded. Processes that were placed in a faulty node always recover in a different node.
The distributed application does not interact with the outside world. Therefore, received messages
are the only nondeterministic event and each process is modeled as a sequence of state intervals, each
one started by a received message. Execution inside each interval is deterministic.
Communication channels and process are both synchronous, i.e., whenever an element is working
correctly, it always will perform its intended function in a finite and known (or predictable) time
bound. Therefore, every communication channel will have a latency bound and every process will
execute each of their state intervals in a time bound.
2.2. Protectors processes
Each protector communicates with another protector in a different node, in such a way that every
protectors is monitored by some other protectors. Together, all protectors perform a distributed
failure detector. When a protector is performing a monitoring function, it sets a watchdog for each
protector it is monitoring. The monitored protector regularly sends control messages in order to reset
the watchdog of its monitor. If a failure occurs in a monitored node, the watchdog of the monitor
protector detects it, and the monitor protector starts the necessary actions in order to recover the
application processes that were placed in the faulty node. Similarly, if a failure occurs in a monitor
node, each monitored protector detects it because it cannot send the reset message to its monitor’s

























Figure 2. Observer state diagram
Each protector also communicates to a set of observers that are in the nodes that it monitors. For
each observer of its set, the protector operates as a remote stable storage; i.e., the protector stores
the checkpoints (and message logs) of the application processes related to each observer of its set.
In Figure 1a, protector T4 monitors T3, and is monitored by T1 (a similar scheme is followed by the
other protectors). Therefore, T4 stores the checkpoints and message logs of the application process
C (via Oc) and T1 stores the checkpoints and message logs of application processes D and E (via Od
and Oe).
Different protector’s interconnections schemes are possible. For example, the nodes can be
grouped in cells regarded to protection scheme, where each cell is built by a chain of protectors
as depicted in Figure 1a. Another possibility is to use nodes only to protect (nodes with no applica-
tion process) and nodes only to compute (nodes with no protector process).
2.3. Observers processes
Observers are RADIC processes attached to each application processes. Each observer process
is “owned” by an application process and has to perform several different tasks. The first task is
to manage the message passing between its application process and the other processes. The sec-
ond task is to maintain a mapping table indicating the location of all application processes and their
respective protectors, i.e., in which node each application process and its respective protector is
located. This table is updated whenever an observer detects a communication failure with another
application process in the MPI world. Each observer uses a simple heuristic in order to update its ta-
ble: if the communication fails, look for the process reincarnation in the node of monitor protector of
the faulty process. Such heuristic avoids that the new location of a faulty node needs to be transmit-
ted for every non-faulty node in the cluster. The third task is taking checkpoints and message-logs of
its application process, and send them to the monitor protector. For non-coordinated schemes, each
observer can have an individual checkpoint policy for its application process. Such independence
allows the implementation of efficient checkpoint strategies in order to reduce the overhead caused
by checkpoints.
Finally, each observer is responsible for performing the rollback-recovery activities when the
system uses fault tolerance schemes that demands coordination during recovery. Is such cases, the
protectors determine the which specific checkpoint is necessary for each process in order to roll back
the system to a consistent state. Such checkpoints are “send back” to the respective observer, and
the observer manages the roll back of their application processes.
Figure 2 shows the observer state diagram. The state transitions are fired by events that comes
from three elements: its monitoring protector, other MPI processes and the application process re-
lated to the observer. There are two different events related to the monitoring protector. The first
476
5event occurs when the observer takes checkpoints and message logs from its application process and
sends them to the monitoring protector of the node where the observer is placed.
The second event occurs when the observer receives a recover command from the protector in-
dicating that it should restart the application process from a previous state (for rollback recovery
protocols that requires coordination).
The observer also has events related to other application processes in the MPI world, whenever
they send messages to its application process. Finally, there are events related to application process
of the observer whenever this process performs an MPI command.
It should be noted that for protocols that need to keep several checkpoints for each application
process, the observer also must to maintain a copy of each checkpoint sent to the observer. Such
requirement comes because the monitoring protector itself is unreliable. Therefore, if the monitoring
protector fails the checkpoint history of their monitored processes is lost and hereafter such processes
cannot be recovered.
2.4. Failure detection and recovery
Figure 1b represents a failure in node N4. In this case, T3 (monitored) and T1 (monitor) detect the
failure in T4. T3 connects to monitor and finds T1. Meanwhile, because T1 was monitoring N4, T1
recovers the application processes of the faulty node N4. Simultaneously, the observers in the node
N3 (in this case only Oc) detect that its checkpoint storage (protector T4) has failed, and search a
new protector in order to establish a new checkpoint storage for their application processes.
Before a protector recovers an application process, it first determines the correct checkpoint that
should be used. For protocols that require a coordinated recovery, the protector array starts a syn-
chronization procedure in order to roll back the system to a consistent state. Since each protector has
checkpoints of a subset of the application processes, they command the observers to resume their
application processes from an earlier state in order to reach a system-global consistent state.
In order to achieve this, each protector transmits the specific checkpoint back to the respective
observer, and commands the observer that restarts the application process from this checkpoint. For
message log protocols, besides rolls back the system to a consistent state, the protector also replays
the messages that are in the message log.
The synchronization between protectors is necessary only for protocols that require global coor-
dination. The message logging pessimistic protocol does not require such coordination because the
recovery data and the recovery protocol itself can rely only in local information [7].
2.5. Comparison with other solutions
There are many solutions using rollback-recovery for implementing fault tolerance in parallel-
distributed systems dedicated to execute scientific long-running applications. Projects such as Starfish,
CoCheck, Egida, FT-MPI, MPI-FT, LAM-MPI, MPICH-V, LA-MPI and Open MPI represent some
recent efforts in attempting to incorporate network and process fault tolerance into message passing
systems using checkpoint and rollback-recovery techniques.
Although such projects do present valid solutions to the fault tolerance problem in clusters, they
focus on performance issues or on protocol details. They dedicate little or none attention to questions
about how the cluster architecture interacts with the fault tolerance scheme or how failures influence
the cluster architecture.
The RADIC architecture simultaneously attend to the following requisites: scalability, trans-
parency, modeling of the relationship between fault-tolerance scheme and the cluster architecture,
and do not request any dedicated nodes in order to operate. Therefore, in this section we have
compared RADIC and other solutions taking these requisites in consideration.
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6CoCheck [13] relies on the Condor checkpoint library, and it is implemented on the top of tuMPI.
It uses coordinated checkpoint and the recover is based on a centralized coordinator. Starfish [1] pro-
vides failure detection and recovery based on coordinated or uncoordinated checkpoint. Starfish lets
the responsibility of recovering to the application. Egida [11] is a toolkit integrated with MPICH. It
changes the p4 parallel programing library send/receive functionalities, and was dedicated to com-
pare the behavior of different rollback-recovery protocols. FT-MPI [8] is not transparent to the
application. It only handles failures at the MPI communicator and the application must manage
the recovery. MPI-FT [10] uses message logging together with a centralized pessimistic strategy
based on a central observer or a distributed optimistic strategy based on each application process.
In case of a failure, MPI-FT restarts a faulty process since the beginning. MPICH-V [3] does define
the architecture for the cluster configuration. However, its fault-tolerant scheme relies in dedicated
nodes to achieve its goal. LAM/MPI [12] uses the Berkeley Labs Checkpoint Library in order to
implement a coordinated checkpoint protocol. However, it does not offer an automatic mechanism
to failure detection and recovery. LA-MPI [2] focuses on network fault tolerance and does not offer
fault tolerance for the application processes. Open MPI [9] is a recent MPI-2 compliant project that
include fault tolerance capabilities in their implementations. Open MPI is a combination of the tech-
nologies from FT-MPI, LA-MPI, LAM-MPI and PACX-MPI. At the time this text is written, fault
tolerance is still not available as a stable feature.
3. Architecture Validation
We validate the RADIC functionality using a prototype implementation called RADICMPI. This
implementation includes a library (radicmpi) and a runtime environment (mpicc and mpirun) that
facilitates the compilation and the program executions.
The current implementation of the library radicmpi contains the following subset of MPI func-
tions: MPI Init, MPI Finalize, MPI Send, MPI Recv, MPI Comm rank, MPI Comm size, MPI Get processor name, MPI Wtime, MPI Type size.
RADICMPI uses the pessimistic message log rollback-recovery protocol because it is the only that
does not compromise the system scalability since it confines the effects of a failure only to the faulty
process. Furthermore, this protocol simplifies garbage collection because the system can simply
discard checkpoints and message logs previous to the most recent checkpoint.
Using RADICMPI, we tested the functionality of RADIC with two programs: ping-pong and
matrix multiplication. Our main interest was to confirm the architecture functionality in the presence
of failures. We used the matrix multiplication program in order to certify the system correctness
under failure conditions. The ping-pong program was used to verify the functionality of each RADIC
module and to control the injection of failures.
We ran the tests in a heterogeneous cluster with six nodes interconnected by a 100BaseT hub: 3
Athlon XP 2600+/1.9GHz/256MB (w2,w3,w4); 1 Pentium 4/2.6GHz/256MB (w5); and 2 Pentium-
III/800MHz/128MB (master,w1). All nodes used Linux Fedora Core 3 with kernel 2.6.9-1.667. For
checkpointing we used the library developed by Victor Zandy [14]. All softwares were compiled
using GNU g++ compiler v3.4.2. The protectors array was organized in a chain like Figure 1a.
The overheads for a master-worker matrix multiplication algorithm are summarized in Figure 3. In
order to see the impact of logs over the overall runtime, we used an algorithm that sends one matrix
for all workers and then slice the other matrix among the workers. First, we run the program without
any kind of protection (checkpoints or logs). Then, we executed the algorithm with all protections
activated and forcing a checkpoint approximately at the middle of the execution. One can note
the strong impact of logs and checkpoints over the overall performance. This impact is caused by
the increasing in the message latency caused by message logging mechanism. Furthermore, the
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7master w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
250x250 141 56 133 123 104 65
500x500 58 27 67 62 50 33
1000x1000 32 41 12 11 8.3 5.4
Figure 3. RADIC runtime overheads for a matrix multiplication algorithm. The results were calcu-
lated based on a execution without protection (overhead=runtime protected/runtime unprotected).
large memory space used by the program leads to a large checkpoint overhead because of the large
checkpoint storage time caused (hard disks in the protectors). The RADIC efficiency improves when
the matrix increase in size because the reduction of the log impact in the whole computation time.
Since we were interested only in the functionality of the RADIC architecture, we did not make any
performance measure for these cases because the total application runtime after a failure depends on
the moment where the failure occurs inside a checkpoint interval, because this moment determines
how much a process rolls back.
4. Conclusions
We presented and described RADIC, an architecture model for implementing fault tolerance in
clusters based on the concept of observer and protector processes. RADIC covers all the require-
ments of a fault tolerance architecture for parallel-distributed systems, and also have important fea-
tures. It is scalable since it implements a fully distributed scheme for supporting faults. It is user
transparent since it does not impose any change to the application algorithm. It is independent of the
recover protocol, because the networks of protectors can store checkpoints and message logs from
the observers in order to attend to the different strategies. It should be noted that RADIC also allow
the implementation of non-scalable rollback-recovery protocols, like the ones that require global
coordination in order to perform recovery. Furthermore, non-transparent fault-tolerant can also take
advantage of the RADIC architecture.
We have proved the basic functionalities of the RADIC architecture making tests with RADICMPI.
Now, we are developing a performance model for evaluating the total application runtime as a func-
tion of parameters like checkpoint interval; checkpoint cost; message patterns; application algorithm;
RADIC organization; failure pattern; and computation/communication ratio. Our interest is to in-
vestigate how the cluster architecture is influenced by failures. Our intention is to build a model
in order to allow that the user either evaluates the impact of the fault-tolerance scheme over his/her
application or determine which cluster architecture should attend to his/her application runtime req-
uisites.
We continue the development of RADICMPI in order to make it more efficient for measuring the
parameters necessary for building and validating the performance model. We are also improving
RADICMPI in order to use it with the NAS benchmark. Furthermore, we are evaluating the viability
of using RADIC with implementations like OpenMPI or MPICH2. Such possibility would greatly
facilitate new experiments.
We are also interested in evaluating how the different RADIC configurations operates in massive
clusters. Since scalability is one of our main goals, we are interested in studying how the efficiency
of the protection is affected by the number of machines in the cluster. Furthermore, since mas-
sive clusters can be constructed with different types of network topology, we are concerned about
methods for distributing the observers taking into consideration their distances to the protectors.
4 9
8References
[1] A.M. Agbaria and R. Friedman. Starfish: fault-tolerant dynamic MPI programs on clusters
of workstations. In Proc. of 8th Inter. Symp. on High Perf. Dist. Computing, pages 167–176,
August 1999.
[2] R.T. Aulwes, D.J. Daniel, N.N. Desai, R.L. Graham, L.D. Risinger, M.A. Taylor, T.S. Woodall,
and M.W. Sukalski. Architecture of LA-MPI.
[3] G. Bosilca, A. Bouteiller, F. Cappello, S. Djilali, G. Fedak, C. Germain, T. Herault,
P. Lemarinier, O. Lodygensky, F. Magniette, V. Neri, and A. Selikhov. MPICHV: Toward a
scalable fault tolerant MPI for volatile nodes. In Proc. of SuperComputing 2002 (SC2002),
November 2002.
[4] A. Bouteiller, P. Lemarinier, G. Krawezik, and F. Cappello. Coordinated checkpoint versus
message log for fault tolerant MPI. In In Proc. of 2003 IEEE International Conference on
Cluster Computing, pages 242–250. IEEE, December 2003.
[5] K.M. Chandy and L. Lamport. Distributed snapshots: Determining global states of distributed
systems. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 3(1):63–75, 1985.
[6] A.A. Duarte. RADIC: Redundant array of distributed independent checkpoints. Master’s the-
sis, Universidad Auto´noma de Barcelona, Departamento de Arquitectura de Computadores y
Sistemas Operativos, ETSE, Bellaterra, 08193, Barcelona, Spain, July 2005.
[7] E.N. Elnozahy, L. Alvisi, Y.M. Wang, and D.B. Johnson. A survey of rollback-recovery proto-
cols in message-passing systems. ACM Comput. Surv., 34(3):375–408, 2002.
[8] G. Fagg and J. Dongarra. FT-MPI: Fault tolerant mpi, supporting dynamic applications in
a dynamic world. In Euro PVM/MPI User’s Group Meeting 2000, pages 346–353, Berlin,
Germany, 2000. Springer-Verilag.
[9] E. Gabriel, G.E. Fagg, G. Bosilca, and et al. Open MPI: Goals, concept, and design of a next
generation MPI implementation. In Proc., 11th European PVM/MPI Users’ Group Meeting,
pages 97–104, Budapest, Hungary, September 2004.
[10] S. Louca, N. Neophytou, A. Lachanas, and P. Evripidou. MPI-FT: Portable fault tolerance
scheme for MPI. Parallel Processing Letters, 10(4):371–382, 2000.
[11] S. Rao, L. Alvisi, and H. Vin. Egida: An extensible toolkit for low-overhead fault-tolerance.
In Proc. of IEEE Fault-Tolerant Computing Symposium (FTCS-29), Madison, WI, June 1999.
[12] S. Sankaran, J.M. Squyres, B. Barrett, A. Lumsdaine, J. Duell, P. Hargrove, and E. Roman. The
LAM/MPI checkpoint/restart framework: System-initiated checkpointing. In Proc. of LACSI
Symposium, Sante Fe, New Mexico, USA, October 2003.
[13] G. Stellner. Cocheck: Checkpointing and process migration for MPI. In Proc. of Inter. Paral-
lel Processing Symp., pages 526–531, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, April 1996. IEEE Computer
Society Press.
[14] V. Zandy. Ckpt - a process checkpoint library. http://www.cs.wisc.edu/ zandy/ckpt/, April
2005.
4 0
